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ARTICLE
CALLING LAW A “PROFESSION” ONLY
CONFUSES THINKING ABOUT THE
CHALLENGES LAWYERS FACE*
THOMAS D. MORGAN**
Abstract: It is appropriate to want lawyers to be mature, moral
people and to want legal education to help reinforce those quali-
ties. It is also appropriate to be sure students understand lawyers’
fiduciary responsibilities and the ways lawyers fall short of meet-
ing them. It only confuses work on those issues, however, to call
them part of teaching “professionalism.” Law is not a “profes-
sion” as that term has traditionally been used. Calling law a pro-
fession does not help understanding the challenges lawyers face.
I was invited to participate in this symposium, I believe, primarily be-
cause I have argued that “law is not a profession and that’s a good thing.”1
Professor Neil Hamilton of the St. Thomas faculty criticized my position,2
and I expect that the terms “professional” and “professionalism” may be an
important part of others’ papers. I predict that—at the end of the day—most
of us will agree on many kinds of behavior we believe represent good law-
yer conduct; but I think that how we reach and express our conclusions
matters, both to us and to others we are trying to help think more clearly
* Symposium paper for: The Lawyer’s Role and Professional Formation, University of St.
Thomas School of Law, September 23, 2011.
** Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law, The George Washington
University Law School.
1. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 66–69 (2010); see also
Thomas D. Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 947
(2002). Some of the arguments made in this article have also been made in these prior publica-
tions. I have not been alone in asserting this position. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s
Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corpo-
rate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008).
2. Neil Hamilton, The Profession and Professionalism Are Dead?: A Review of Thomas
Morgan, The Vanishing American Lawyer (2010), 20 A.B.A. PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2010 at 14; see
also John M. Conley, Is Law Really a Profession?: Review of the Vanishing American Lawyer, by
Thomas D. Morgan, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1183 (2011).
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about their lives and careers. I offer these remarks to further that
conversation.
In my view, “professionalism” is a feel-good term, but a term without
content. We may think we can recognize good professional behavior when
we see it, but the terms “professional” and “professionalism” tend to mean
what a given speaker wants them to mean. Too often, people who invoke
professionalism use it to stop analysis rather than further it. In short, profes-
sionalism tends to be a rallying cry, not a concept.
What I hope to do in this paper is look at several ways the term “pro-
fessionalism” has been defined and used. I will suggest that professionalism
best describes qualities of personal character, not an occupational role. I
will acknowledge that persons who practice law are required to behave in
ways associated with their role, but I will suggest that calling those obliga-
tions “professional” does not advance understanding or behavior. I will sug-
gest that yet other uses of the terms “professional” and “professionalism”
have been destructive and should be abandoned.
I. SOCIOLOGISTS’ UNDERSTANDING OF A PROFESSION
Sociology is a field that studies how human societies organize them-
selves. Thus, it is not surprising that sociologists have had to address the
concept of professions and professional work.3 The story sociologists have
told about professions, in turn, has influenced how lawyers sometimes think
about themselves. Professor Hamilton summarizes the sociological account
and its implications for law and lawyers very well when he says:
Since the late 1800s, the peer-review professions in the United
States, including the legal profession, have gradually worked out
stable social contracts with the public in both custom and law.
The public grants a profession autonomy to regulate itself through
peer review, expecting the profession’s members to control entry
into and continued membership in the profession, to set standards
for how individual professionals perform their work so that it
serves the public good in the area of the profession’s responsibil-
ity, and to foster the core values and ideals of the profession.
In return, each member of the profession and the profession as a
whole agree to meet certain correlative duties to the public: to
maintain high standards of minimum competence and ethical con-
duct, to serve the public purpose of the profession and to disci-
pline those who fail to meet these standards; to promote the core
values and ideals of the profession; and to restrain self-interest to
some degree to serve the public purpose of the profession. The
3. Leading analyses of professions include ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS:
AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE
THIRD LOGIC: ON THE PRACTICE OF KNOWLEDGE (2001); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PRO-
FESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEG-
RITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2005).
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term “professionalism” . . . captures the correlative duties of the
profession’s social contract for each individual professional.4
Sociologist Eliot Friedson goes on to assert that professional work “is
so specialized as to be inaccessible to those lacking the required training
and experience, and [thus] . . . cannot be standardized, rationalized or . . .
commodified.”5 The premise of both Professor Hamilton and Professor
Friedson’s descriptions of the legal profession, then, is that law and legal
issues are largely impenetrable by non-lawyers and that responsibility for
both has been entrusted to the legal profession.
In reality, the social contract story bears little or no relation to lawyers,
either across American history or as we know them today. Large parts of
America began with no lawyers at all.6 None came over on the Mayflower,
and the first lawyer who arrived in Massachusetts was disbarred for jury
tampering.7 Clergy acted as the judges in many of the colonies; and while
the Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina colonies tolerated lawyer prac-
tice, they set such restrictive limits on lawyers’ fees that few could make a
living.8 While there were professional lawyers in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, by the time of Andrew Jackson’s election in
1836, the situation had completely changed. Professor Lawrence Friedman
explains:
[W]ith the rise of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy, the
leading political party opposed the idea of government by ex-
perts. . . . [Thus,] it would have been surprising if a narrow, elitist
[legal] profession grew up—a small exclusive guild. No such pro-
4. Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 A.B.A. PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2008 at 1,
5. In the context of lawyers’ work, sociologist Eliot Friedson, a member of the ABA Commission
on Professionalism, defines a profession as:
An occupation whose members have special privileges, such as exclusive licensing, that
are justified by the following assumptions:
(1) That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and the use of complex
judgments.
(2) That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the service, they must
trust those they consult.
(3) That the client’s trust presupposes that the practitioner’s self-interest is overbal-
anced by devotion to serving both the client’s interest and the public good, and
(4) That the occupation is self-regulating—that is, organized in such a way as to
assure the public and the courts that its members are competent, do not violate their
client’s trust, and transcend their own self-interest.
A.B.A. COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “ . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT
FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986).
5. FRIEDSON, supra note 3, at 17.
6. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAW-
YERS 8 (1983).
7. Richard B. Morris, The Legal Profession in America on the Eve of the Revolution, in
POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 3, 5 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1976); see also LAW-
RENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94–97 (2d ed. 1985). Professor Friedman
importantly reminds readers, however, that each colony was different and generalizations about
colonial experience are inevitably oversimplified. Id. at 36–37, 98–99.
8. Morris, supra note 7, at 4–11; see also Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for
Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1414–23 (2004).
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fession developed. There were tendencies in this direction during
the colonial period; but after the Revolution the dam burst, and
the number of lawyers . . . has never stopped growing. In Massa-
chusetts, in 1740, there were only about 15 lawyers (the popula-
tion was about 150,000). A century later, in 1840, there were 640
lawyers in the state—ten times as many in ratio to the
population.9
In fairness, Professor Hamilton dates the social contract with Ameri-
can lawyers as the “late 1800s,” after the period of Jacksonian influence. In
effect, however, Professor Hamilton is thus conceding that the idea of law
being a profession is largely a creation of the American Bar Association
(ABA), founded in 1878. The ABA used little professionalism rhetoric in
its early years; but wounded by criticism that lawyers largely existed to help
large corporations evade the law,10 people like Dean Wigmore seized on the
concept of law as a “profession” when he said in 1915:
The law as a pursuit is not a trade. It is a profession. It ought to
signify for its followers a mental and moral setting apart from the
multitude,—a priesthood of Justice. . . .
How the present attitude has come about is easy to see. . . . In a
country where all men started even and each man had to earn his
living,—where tradition and privilege were cast aside,— . . . the
Law took its place with other livelihoods; and its gainful aspect
became emphasized. And then . . . came the commercial expan-
sion following the Civil War; and the lawyer was more and more
drawn into the intimate relations as adviser of the business man.
And now, in the large cities, the commercial standards have
spread to the Law, and the profession has been merged into the
trade.
Nevertheless, that is all an error. That is, the inherent nature of
things demands always that the Law shall be a profession.11
During the 1920s, professionalism rhetoric was again largely laid
aside, and it was not until 1936 that the ABA strenuously renewed its call
for lawyer professionalism. President Franklin Roosevelt had backed
9. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 304.
10. One such charge was heard from the “bully pulpit” of President Theodore Roosevelt in
his 1905 Harvard commencement address. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, IV PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES
AND STATE PAPERS 407 (1910), quoted in James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Ca-
nons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2404 (2003). President Roosevelt’s charge is given
credence in Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Practices
of New York City Lawyers, 1870–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR
AMERICA 51 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
11. John H. Wigmore, Preface to ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, at
xxi–xxii (1915). The year earlier, Louis Brandeis had published his own important book, BUSI-
NESS—A PROFESSION (1914), that called upon business itself to place the public interest above
profit. See also JOHN R. DOS PASSOS, THE AMERICAN LAWYER AS HE WAS—AS HE IS—AS HE
CAN BE (1907) (discussing the historical role of the lawyer and the pitfalls that have developed as
the profession has evolved into a business).
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“Codes of Fair Competition,” prepared by tripartite institutions of labor,
management and government, but that arguably had little legal basis. Many
lawyers (and their corporate clients) were anxious about the New Deal and
sought to have the work of law and lawyers be seen as independent of the
work of political institutions. Just two years earlier, Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone had argued:
[W]e may rightly look to the Bar for leadership in the preserva-
tion and development of American institutions. Specially trained
in the field of law and government, invested with the unique priv-
ileges of his office, experienced in the world of affairs, and versed
in the problems of business organization and administration, to
whom, if not to the lawyer, may we look for guidance in solving
the problems of a sorely stricken social order? . . .
Throughout the history of Anglo-American civilization, the pro-
fessional groups have been among the most significant of those
non-governmental agencies which promote the public welfare.
Although in smaller measure, . . . their function has been not un-
like that of the medieval guilds. . . . While it has not inherited the
completely independent status of the English bar, to no other
group in this country has the state granted comparable privileges
or permitted so much autonomy. No other is so closely related to
the state, and no other has traditionally exerted so powerful an
influence on public opinion and public policy.12
Giving authority to the new ABA House of Delegates that included
state bar associations and other potentially-influential professional groups
gave the ABA hope that it could help lawyers marshal public influence
behind common positions.13 Among the first things the newly-transformed
American Bar Association aggressively—and successfully—opposed was
President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.14 Then, after World War II, the
ABA asserted political ideals favorable to loyalty oaths and other parts of
the anti-Communist movement.15
It was in that context that Dean Roscoe Pound in 1953 defined “pro-
fessionalism” in terms that the ABA Commission on Professionalism
picked up again in 1986 and that proponents of professionalism use today:
12. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2, 4–5 (1934).
13. EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK
173–76 (1953).
14. See, e.g., Frederick H. Stinchfield, The Supreme Court Issue, 23 A.B.A. J. 233 (1937)
(analyzing President Roosevelt’s speeches from March 4 and March 9, 1937, concluding the pro-
posal to expand the size of the Supreme Court would be for the sake of efficiency and would
result in changing the government from a constitutional government to a legislative government).
The same volume of the ABA Journal contains a discussion by a member of the House of Dele-
gates about the need to increase lawyer income by reducing the number of new lawyers. John
Kirkland Clark, Limitation of Admission to the Bar, 23 A.B.A. J. 48 (1937).
15. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 231–59 (1976).
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The term refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of a public service—no less a public
service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood. Pur-
suit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the pri-
mary purpose. Gaining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a
business or trade it is the entire purpose.16
II. ABUSIVE USES OF THE PROFESSIONALISM IDEAL
What has bothered me most about the idea that professionalism re-
quires ceding lawyers control over their work has been lawyers’ tendency to
use that supposed authority to pursue their own political agendas and self-
interest over the interests of justice and the public. During the time that
Dean Pound was espousing professionalism and decrying “gaining a liveli-
hood,” in at least equal measure, the ABA was concerned about the eco-
nomic health of post-World War II lawyers. An ABA publication, The 1958
Lawyer and his 1938 Dollar, asserted that the average lawyer in 1954
earned less than $7,382, a figure said to be less than “a living wage.”17 To
change their economic fortunes, lawyers were urged to get over their failure
“to utilize techniques that smack of commercial enterprise.”18 The key to
lawyers’ economic success, the volume went on, lay in increasing the law-
yer’s return from each hour worked. The concept sounds familiar to modern
lawyers even if the numbers do not:
There are only approximately 1300 fee-earning hours per year un-
less the lawyer works overtime. Many of the 8 hours per day
available for office work are consumed in personal, civic, bar,
religious and political activities, general office administration and
other non-remunerative matters . . . [so] chargeable time will av-
erage 5 hours per day [for 260 days per year].19
Lawyers were urged to set a target income for themselves and divide it
by 1,300 to set their hourly rate. Not all cases would support that rate, the
authors noted, but in that case the lawyer “must secure additional business
and increase his number of working hours, the greater number of chargeable
hours at the present hourly rate giving him the desired gross.”20
Further, lawyers long tried to restrict clients’ ability to retain other
lawyers who might take the clients away or who might represent clients
challenging the status quo. Ultimately, in several cases, the Supreme Court
has struck down professional standards embodying such ambitions.
16. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953).
17. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ECONOMICS ON LAW PRACTICE, THE 1958 LAWYER AND
HIS 1938 DOLLAR 9 (1958).
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id. In the case of a law partnership, the report observed, “[t]he estimated earning power
of the younger men should include an anticipated profit to be realized [by the partners] from their
services.” Id. at 14.
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In NAACP v. Button,21 for example, the state of Virginia had prohib-
ited contact of potential clients by agents of any person or association that
“employs, retains or compensates” any attorney in a judicial proceeding in
which the person or organization “is not a party and in which it has no
pecuniary right or liability.”22 As applied to the NAACP, the provision pro-
hibited lawyers from cooperating with efforts to organize citizens to chal-
lenge racial segregation in the public schools.23 The state asserted that
lawyers’ attempts to obtain legal work are not speech protected by the First
Amendment, but the Supreme Court brushed the argument aside.
“[L]itigation is . . . a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality
of treatment . . . for the members of the Negro community in this coun-
try,”24 Justice Brennan wrote for the Court. Whatever propriety the ABA
Canons and Virginia Rules had in the context of lawyers seeking pecuniary
gain, the Court said lawyers’ ethical standards did not enjoy immunity from
constitutional review.25
Even more significant in exposing the lawyers to the same regulations
under which almost everyone else worked was the Court’s 1975 decision in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.26 When Lewis Goldfarb tried to buy a house
21. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
22. Id. at 423 (quoting VA. CODE § 54-78 (1950) (superseded by VA. CODE § 54.1-3941
(1988))).
23. Perhaps the Court found it relevant that the Virginia statute had been passed in 1956, just
two years after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), had created the legal rights
that the NAACP sought to enforce. However, the Court expressly said that it would have reached
the same result if the older ABA Canons of Ethics had been the source of the prohibition. Button,
371 U.S. at 429 n.11.
24. Id. at 429.
25. Id. at 439–43. It seems clear that the Court understood what it was doing. A vigorous
dissent by Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart reminded the majority that it had invaded “the
domain of state regulatory power over the legal profession.” Id. at 448–65. Of course, Button was
focused on a challenge to ethics rules that affected the vindication of civil rights, but the Supreme
Court refused to so limit Button when it decided Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Virginia ex
rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), the next year. There, the Union had made a list of
lawyers whom it encouraged railway employees or their survivors to consult about job related
deaths or injuries. These were ordinary damage actions from which lawyers sought “pecuniary
gain” found not to be present in Button. Union members had traditionally been the victims of
incompetent lawyers and aggressive claims adjusters, the Court asserted. The union’s program
was not “ambulance chasing” and the union was not itself practicing law; it was simply recom-
mending that, before settling their cases, union members consult counsel whom the union had
found to be competent. Use of ethics standards to bar such recommendations was held to violate
First Amendment rights of both free speech and free association. Id. at 5–6; see also United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 579–86 (1971) (holding the Constitution
requires a state to permit a union to recommend lawyers to pursue suits under the Federal Employ-
ers’ Liability Act and to secure a commitment from those lawyers not to charge a fee in excess of
25% of the amount recovered); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217,
221–24 (1967) (giving constitutional protection to a union’s practice of employing a salaried
lawyer to represent members wanting to prosecute worker’s compensation claims before the
state’s Industrial Commission).
26. 421 U.S. 773, 779–93 (1975) (holding the legal profession is not exempt from the Sher-
man Act and that the county’s published minimum-fee schedule constitutes price fixing).
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in Fairfax County, Virginia, he found that all the lawyers he consulted pro-
posed to charge him exactly the same fee. The legal issue became the valid-
ity of the minimum fee schedule recommended by the Fairfax County Bar
Association, a voluntary bar, but one that was recognized by the Virginia
State Bar, the group with disciplinary authority over the state’s lawyers.
Although compliance with the fee schedule was said not to be mandatory,
the State Bar had opined that a lawyer’s “habitual” failure to comply with
local fee schedules would “raise a presumption” that the lawyer was im-
properly soliciting cases.27
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, who later became a critic of the
“commercialization” of the legal profession, the Court found that the “vol-
untary” fee schedule had the practical effect of fixing prices for legal ser-
vices in Fairfax County. More significantly for lawyers who thought
themselves sheltered from outside regulation, the Court expressly rejected a
contention that, as a “learned profession,” the practice of law is not subject
to antitrust constraints, saying:
The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide
sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the public-service aspect
of professional practice controlling in determining whether § 1
includes professions. . . . Whatever else it may be, the examina-
tion of a land title is a service; the exchange of such a service for
money is ‘commerce’ in the most common usage of that word. It
is no disparagement of the practice of law as a profession to ac-
knowledge that it has this business aspect.28
The combination of First Amendment and Sherman Act attacks made
it inevitable that the idea that, as professionals, lawyers could look only
inward for their regulation was gone forever. The coup de graˆce was in-
flicted two years later in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.29 Once again, the
case involved the prohibition of solicitation. This time, John Bates and Van
O’Steen had opened a “legal clinic” in Phoenix and had published a news-
paper advertisement describing routine services they would perform such as
uncontested divorces, adoptions, name changes, and simple personal bank-
ruptcies for relatively low fees. The Court’s response to arguments that pro-
fessionalism required prohibition of such advertising was withering:
27. Id. at 777 n.5, 778 n.6 (citing Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. No. 170
(1971)).
28. Id. at 787–88 (internal citations omitted). The Court closed: “In holding that certain an-
ticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no diminution
of the authority of the State to regulate its professions.” Id. at 793. However, that qualification has
not reduced the significance of the decision. Just three years later, when an engineering associa-
tion tried to rely on this language to justify its ethical restraint on competitive bidding, the Court
quickly brushed aside the special character of professions. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686–97 (1978); see also Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457
U.S. 332, 342–57 (1982) (fee schedule for particular doctor services).
29. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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We recognize, of course, and commend the spirit of public ser-
vice with which the profession of law is practiced and to which it
is dedicated. . . . But we find the postulated connection between
advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely
strained. At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys must
conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact
that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few
attorneys engage in such self-deception. . . . In fact, it has been
suggested that the failure of lawyers to advertise creates public
disillusionment with the profession. The absence of advertising
may be seen to reflect the profession’s failure to reach out and
serve the community.30
My point in this section, then, is that lawyers have used professional-
ism rhetoric in the past to defend practices that outside observers could
easily see served the interest of lawyers but not the interest of the public or
the interest of justice. That use of professionalism continues to this day. In
August 2011, the ABA House of Delegates again made my point when it
invoked professionalism and professional standards to deny support for
Uniform Collaborative Law Rules and the Uniform Collaborative Law
Act.31
Collaborative law is an effort to negotiate resolutions of controversies
involving people who recognize they will want to deal constructively with
their present adversary in the future.32 Divorced spouses may have differ-
ences today, for example, but they may want to come out of the disputes
better able to share child raising over time. Likewise, a manufacturer and its
principal supplier may dispute the quality of a particular shipment, but they
may both want to strengthen their relationship rather than end it.
Even today, the ABA Model Rules would permit a single lawyer to try
to represent both clients in a good-faith effort to resolve their differences.33
If the negotiations broke down, that lawyer could not represent either client
30. Id. at 368–70. “False, deceptive, or misleading” advertising may be regulated, and “lim-
ited” disclaimers may be required as to lawyer’s claims about themselves. However, “truthful
advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services,” is protected by the
First Amendment. Other cases upholding First Amendment protection of most lawyer advertising
include In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 198–207 (1982); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 637–56 (1985); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 471–80 (1988); Peel
v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91, 105–11 (1990). But see Fla.
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622–35 (1995) (upholding prohibition of targeted direct
mail within 30 days of an accident or disaster).
31. The Act was prepared and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 2009 for adoption by state legislatures and revised in 2010 as Rules for
adoption by state supreme courts. The official version contains a long explanatory preface. UNIF.
COLLABORATIVE LAW RULES & UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT prefatory note (amended 2010),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/2010_final.htm. As of 2011, the Act
has been adopted in Utah, Nevada, and Texas. Id.
32. Id.
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 28–33 (2003). Prior to 2002, the sub-
stance of these comments was found in Rule 2.2 (Intermediation).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-2\UST210.txt unknown Seq: 10  7-DEC-12 10:28
2011] CALLING LAW A “PROFESSION” 551
in later litigation.34 What collaborative law does is define a similar role for
two lawyers, one representing each party but both explicitly trying to reach
a settlement rather than a judicially-imposed result. The National Commis-
sion on Uniform State Laws (NCUSL) has worked out such a collaborative
process that can be adopted as state legislation or rules of court.35
The response from the Section of Litigation was indignant opposition,
centered around the concept of professionalism. First, the idea that the ABA
could acknowledge the power of states to adopt new legal processes and
lawyer regulation was said to be contrary to the professional ideal that law-
yers regulate themselves. Never before, the opponents argued, had the ABA
recognized a legislative power of lawyer regulation; and even though the
NCUSL proposal took the form of proposed court rules as well, the ABA
could not take the risk that a legislature might act instead.
Second, the proposal required that if a collaborative negotiation pro-
cess failed, statements made during the negotiation should be deemed privi-
leged. Lawyers involved also were required to withdraw and turn the matter
over to others for the litigation. Never before, opponents argued, had the
ABA required lawyer disqualification if negotiations break down,36 ignor-
ing of course that the current intermediation principle requires exactly
that.37 Throughout the debate, the premise was that the greatness of our
legal system is found in the clash of strong advocates, each assuming the
other lawyer’s client is trying to take advantage of his or her own client.
Asking the ABA to abandon this ideal of professionalism at its best, the
opponents successfully argued, would be more than lawyers should have to
bear.
In telling this contemporary story, my point is not that collaborative
law should be for every lawyer or every case. Indeed, it may be that parties
will find that the regime sounds better on paper than it works in reality. My
point is simply that “professionalism” was invoked in defense of preposter-
ous claims. The concept was invoked so as to stop analysis rather than as-
sist it. My purpose in opposing “professionalism” as a concept or a category
of argument, then, is to try to limit the harm the term has caused and contin-
ues to cause today.
34. Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 29; see also ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 07-447 (2007).
35. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT (amended 2010). The act was adopted by the National
Conference on Uniform State Laws in 2009 and amended in 2010 to respond to earlier ABA
concerns.
36. A video record of the debate is found in Memoranda on 2011 Annual Meeting of Ameri-
can Bar Association and Meeting of House of Delegates (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/leadership/2011_annual_house_mtg_docs.html.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
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III. OTHERS’ EFFORTS TO MAKE SENSE OF “PROFESSIONALISM”
Over the years, I have noticed that others whom I admire—including
Professor Hamilton and others at this conference—have not always joined
in my view of professionalism. They seem to have accepted the term as
simply part of the lawyer landscape, or they have tried to “redeem” the term
by claiming that it supports their own view of how lawyers should behave.
What keeps the idea of professionalism alive and encourages calls for
its restoration? In part, it is surely that professional status is flattering to
many lawyers, and appeals in the name of professionalism are taken more
seriously as a result. But it is also true that many elements of professional-
ism represent personal qualities or styles of behavior that appropriately ap-
peal to lawyers’ aspirations to live good lives and act in ways that serve the
public interest. In this part of the paper, I will try to describe a few of those
other views and explain why they have not persuaded me to change my
mind.
A. Professionalism as Aspiration Higher than Rules
One recurring theme in professionalism debates is that Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct38 represent reasonable floors (i.e., minimally-acceptable
conduct), but professionalism calls lawyers to aspire to higher standards of
behavior.39 That distinction might initially seem inspirational, but it largely
misunderstands the multiple functions of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
A few rules are indeed floors. One function of the Model Rules is to
identify when there is a basis for imposing sanctions, and to do that, some
rules are expressed in terms of minimum standards. Rule 1.1, for example,
requires a lawyer to act with “competence” (i.e., to avoid legal malpractice)
whereas most lawyers would aspire to excellence. But even Rule 1.1 does
more than set a low bar. It defines four elements against which competence
is to be judged: legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation.40
And it describes what a lawyer may and should do in an emergency when a
38. As a practical matter, what I will be describing are the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct; but because the only rules with legal effect are those adopted for use in a given jurisdic-
tion, I will tend to use this more generic description.
39. In Professionalism Defined, the Florida Bar quotes approvingly from an interview with
Georgia Chief Justice Harold G. Clark:
‘Professionalism differs from ethics in the sense that ethics is a minimum standard . . .
while professionalism is a higher standard expected of all lawyers. Professionalism im-
poses no official sanctions. It offers no official reward. Yet, sanctions and rewards exist
unofficially. Who faces a greater sanction than lost respect? Who faces a greater reward
than the satisfaction of doing right for right’s own sake?’
Henry Latimer Ctr. for Professionalism, Professionalism Defined, THE FLORIDA BAR (May 27,
2011), http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBProfess.nsf/5D2A29F983DC81EF85256709006A486A/
AC951AC3ADA1F20085256B2F006CCDA6?OpenDocument.
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
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client needs assistance that the lawyer does not really have the competence
to provide.41
Other Rules of Professional Conduct are much the same. Rule 1.3 pro-
hibits a lawyer from acting with less than “reasonable diligence and
promptness”42 but then urges even greater attention to a client’s matters.43
Rule 1.5 prohibits charging an “unreasonable” fee but then offers valuable
guides as to what should go into setting a fee.44 These and other rules45
clearly do set floors, but each is couched in terms that encourage a lawyer
to perform at a higher level and none require use of the term “professional-
ism” to do so.46
Many rules, however, are not floors at all; they give a lawyer some
discretion about how to act in situations where important values are in con-
flict. Rule 1.6, for example, asserts the important principle that a lawyer
must protect a client’s confidential information.47 It defines confidential in-
formation broadly and then identifies specific exceptions where the protec-
tion of the client may give way to protection of others.48 Similar calls for
exercise of reasonable judgment are found in Rule 1.14 on representing
clients with diminished capacity49 and Rule 2.1 on giving a client “candid
advice.”50 It is reasonable to disagree about whether the breadth of the un-
derlying protection—or the focus of the exceptions—are properly defined,
but it seems to me meaningless to say that Rule 1.6 defines a “minimum”
standard of conduct or that a lawyer behaving “professionally” should fol-
low different standards.
I have spent many years of my career trying to “restate” the law gov-
erning lawyers and writing and critiquing rules that regulate lawyer con-
duct. I share the views of many in the field of legal ethics that we must try
to articulate principles better and that situations can arise in which civil
disobedience is the most appropriate course. What does not follow, in my
view, is that terms like “professional behavior” or “professionalism” ad-
vance the effort to improve conduct.
41. Id. at R. 1.1 cmt. 3.
42. Id. at R. 1.3.
43. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 3.
44. Id. at R. 1.5(a).
45. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.4 (communication); id. at R 1.13 (organization as client); id. at R. 4.2
(communication with person represented by counsel).
46. Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking “Professionalism,” 41 EMORY L.J.
403 (1992), argues that professionalism largely means delivering very good legal services. I have
no disagreement with the desire to do that, but use of the term “professionalism” does little to
advance that ideal.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
48. Id. at R. 1.6(b).
49. Id. at R. 1.14 (urging the lawyer to “as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client,” but where necessary to “take reasonably necessary
protective action”).
50. Id. at R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (reminding the lawyer that “advice couched in narrow legal terms
may be of little value . . . especially where practical considerations . . . are predominant”).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-2\UST210.txt unknown Seq: 13  7-DEC-12 10:28
554 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:2
B. Professionalism as Civility
When many advocates speak of professionalism, they seem to have in
mind “civility,” which in turn comes down to moderating the intensely ad-
versarial spirit that many lawyers bring to their work. The Lawyer’s Creed
of Professionalism, for example, says:
I will endeavor to achieve my client’s lawful objectives in busi-
ness transactions and in litigation as expeditiously and economi-
cally as possible. . . . I will advise my client that civility and
courtesy are not to be equated with weakness. . . . I will cooperate
with opposing counsel when scheduling changes are re-
quested. . . . I will make every effort to agree with other coun-
sel . . . on a voluntary exchange of information . . . . [And i]n civil
matters, I will stipulate to facts as to which there is no genuine
dispute.51
The smooth progression of litigation is important to the courts, and it is
not surprising to see judges encouraging more voluntary cooperation and
fewer matters for the court to decide. I also share the view that there could
be more nuance in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that discuss
how litigation is to be conducted, but the rules already mandate honesty in
dealings with a court52 and third parties.53 They say a lawyer may not “em-
barrass” or “burden” any person, even an opposing party.54 There is a prac-
tical limit to how many ways one can tell a lawyer who is a jerk how to
behave as a mature adult.
Further, it is not obviously preferable that lawyers fail to protect their
clients’ interests if such protection might cause them to be less civil than
others might wish. Civility is a behavior whose very definition depends on
context. Much of the time, polite behavior is both desirable and produces
results that will be in a client’s long-term interest.55 Describing “profession-
alism” as a synonym for “civility,” however, does not advance the analysis.
C. Professionalism as Acting as a Check on Client Conduct
One can argue that preserving the rule of law is a special professional
obligation of lawyers. One can argue as well that a lawyer’s duty to see that
his or her clients obey the law is as great as the duty to protect clients
51. The ABA House of Delegates in 1988 proposed this creed for use by state bar associa-
tions and their members, but made clear that its principles did not replace any part of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2011 SE-
LECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 675–77 (2011).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a).
53. Id. at R. 4.1.
54. Id. at R. 4.4(a).
55. On this subject, I would acknowledge the civility of Professor Neil Hamilton in showing
me a draft of his review of my book in advance and in writing that review in a tone that reflects
our long friendship. I appreciate that civility and value that friendship and hope that the tone on
this article reflects the same spirit.
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against abuses the legal system can impose.56 Arguably, some things should
not be subject to partisanship or self-interest.57 In an address in 1910 to the
American Bar Association, for example, Woodrow Wilson said:
You are not a mere body of expert business advisers in the
field of civil law, or a mere body of expert advocates for those
who get entangled in the meshes of the criminal law. You are
servants of the public, of the state itself. You are under bonds to
serve the general interest, the integrity and enlightenment of law
itself, in the advice you give individuals.58
Professors Robert Gordon and William Simon have tried to “redeem”
such a view of professionalism in a way that fits their own ideals. Each has
argued that lawyers should maintain a critical independence from their cli-
ents’ values, an independence facilitated by the sense that lawyers as pro-
fessionals are inherently different from other kinds of advisers.59
The problem with such a view, of course, is that lawyers cannot truly
be independent of their clients.60 Quite apart from their status as fiduciaries
who are legally required to pursue their client’s interests, they have value to
the clients only as they serve those interests. People do not retain a lawyer
to preserve the rule of law; they retain a lawyer for an instrumental reason
(i.e., to get a useful service). Indeed, lawyer creativity in helping business
firms find ways to do things differently than they had previously tried has
been arguably one of the things that has made economic development as
dynamic as it has been.
What observers like to hope happened is that, in the process, lawyers
also restrained excesses in which corporate officials would have engaged.
Some of that may have occurred.61 Elihu Root is quoted as saying, for ex-
ample, that “half of what a lawyer must do is tell his client he is a damn
56. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1988);
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090–91 (1988).
57. See, e.g., PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE AS THEY DO 85–92 (1998); SOL M.
LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 4, 9–18 (1994) (arguing that the rule of law is diminished when lawyers see
their role as to help clients get what they want rather than what they are entitled to); Kenneth M.
Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 155, 224 (2006) (stating law schools have a duty to teach lawyers their role in preserving
democratic institutions).
58. ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS: A SURVEY
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DISCIPLINE AND DISBARMENT 57 (1952).
59. See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in
LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFES-
SION 230 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992); see also Robert
W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 288–92 (1990);
William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic Per-
spectives, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987, 1007–09 (2010).
60. See, e.g., Stephen Pepper, Integrating Morality and Law in Legal Practice: A Reply to
Professor Simon, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1022 (2010).
61. There certainly was rhetoric to that effect at the time the ABA first prepared its Canons
of Ethics in 1908. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal
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fool.”62 It’s a wonderful line; urging clients to adhere to the law is an im-
portant part of the counseling that lawyers do.63 The problem is that there is
no evidence that even Root’s clients took his advice. Calling moral business
counsel “professionalism” may do little harm, but it is also unlikely to add
much to realistic analysis of the actual advice a lawyer should convey.
D. Professionalism as Pro Bono Service
Some of the most promising calls for professionalism are those for
lawyers to engage in public service, including pro bono legal services. Few
would deny the value of pro bono service to poor clients and its role in
establishing legal principles that assist people other than the clients them-
selves. Given the fact that neither the ABA Model Rules nor the rules of
any state require that lawyers engage in any pro bono service,64 one can
argue that rule compliance does not capture this aspect of a lawyer’s
behavior.
There is some evidence that large firm lawyers are doing more pro
bono service than in earlier years,65 although whether the reason is that
lawyers today simply have more time on their hands is open to speculation.
In any event, the personal instincts to subordinate self-interest and come to
the aid of another unquestionably deserves applause. The question is
whether it adds anything to call the behavior a sign of “professionalism.”
Lawyers claim pro bono service as a common heritage, but Professor
Richard Abel points out that even the most generous groups of lawyers
typically contribute only about one percent of their collective time to such
service.66 Particular lawyers who provide pro bono service deserve personal
credit, but the fact they do so does not make lawyers part of a profession.
Voluntary legal aid societies around the country have delivered legal
services to the poor since at least the founding of the New York Society in
1876.67 Sadly, however, many programs of legal service for the poor have
Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 267–68 (1992); Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do
Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 6–9 (1999).
62. ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 4–7 (1964).
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2003).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 describes pro bono service as a lawyer’s “pro-
fessional responsibility” but then says only that a lawyer “should aspire” to render such service.
The voluntary nature of pro bono services was not an oversight. A proposal for mandatory pro
bono service was so vigorously opposed in the ABA House of Delegates in 1983 that it put in
danger the entire Model Rules project. ABA COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROF’L STANDARDS,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1982). Then, when the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
revisited the issue, full-time lawyers in legal services agencies opposed mandatory pro bono ser-
vice, arguing that they did not want to spend their time training “amateurs.”
65. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by
Doing Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2376–78 (2010).
66. Richard L. Abel, The Paradoxes of Pro Bono Service, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2443, 2444
(2010).
67. See, e.g., EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF THE
AVAILABILITY OF LAWYERS’ SERVICES FOR PERSONS UNABLE TO PAY FEES 7 (1951); JOHN MAC-
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had as much to do with the interests of lawyers as the interests of clients.
Concerns about meeting the legal needs of “persons of moderate means”68
arose at the end of World War II as soldiers who had received free legal
services while in the military came home and needed to buy houses, start
businesses, and the like. The expressed concern was about how to meet
their needs. “Lawyer reference plans” (now lawyer referral services) were
one response; legal services offices were another.69
By 1951, the depression was a recent reality; lawyers had returned
from World War II and pro bono services were justified as part of both the
battle against communism (i.e., a way to show the poor that the rule of law
was their friend)70 and an effort to see lawyers fully occupied in profes-
sional activity.71 The legal aid movement was funded heavily by what we
would today call the United Way, not primarily by voluntary services of
lawyers;72 and in the context of the time, the movement was primarily a
way to give experience to law students and practical training to young law-
yers who had gone into military service and wanted to brush up their skills
before setting out on their own.73 Creation of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion, indeed, was in part a government response to a need that lawyers indi-
vidually had refused to assume.74 Though lawyers might like to claim the
ARTHUR MAGUIRE, THE LANCE OF JUSTICE: A SEMI-CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE LEGAL AID
SOCIETY 1876–1926, at 3 (1928); REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 135–36
(1919).
68. The phrase seems to have been coined by Reginald Heber Smith, one of the most promi-
nent figures in the legal aid movement in the first half of the twentieth century. See generally
Reginald Heber Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 1949 WIS. L. REV.
416 (the phrase is used nearly twenty times throughout his work).
69. Id. at 417–24.
70. For example:
It is a fundamental tenet of Marxian Communism that law is a class weapon used by the
rich to oppress the poor through the simple device of making justice too expensive. . . .
Nothing rankles more in the human heart than a brooding sense of injustice. Illness we
can put up with; but injustice makes us want to pull things down.
Reginald Heber Smith, Introduction to BROWNELL, supra note 67, at xiii (1951).
71. Legal clinics for the poor were also seen as a way to provide practical training for young
lawyers who had gone into military service and now wanted to get experience before setting out
on their own. Returning lawyer veterans were denied the G.I. Bill because the government rea-
soned they were already trained. Smith, supra note 68, at 437–44.
72. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES O. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: A SUM-
MARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 86–90 (1954).
73. Smith, supra note 68, at 437–44.
74. The organized Bar was also concerned that if lawyers did not at least appear to assume
such public responsibilities, the government would “socialize” the profession:
For selfish and unselfish reasons we hope that the new world will be attracted by our
form of government and the American way of life so that, in other nations, free peoples
will set up democratic regimes and institutions. In order that our general system may
make its maximum appeal, and because we are not hypocrites, we are engaged in reex-
amining our own institutions. We want to keep what is good, and add what is found
needed. Law is the foundation of our whole structure. We are determined that it shall be
strong. We know that law is not self-enforcing, and that lawyers are essential.
Id. at 444.
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core value of furthering access to the legal system, the idea that lawyers
historically acknowledged that core value is questionable.
IV. PROFESSIONALISM AS QUALITIES OF PERSONAL CHARACTER
Each of us tends to recognize good lawyer behavior when we see it.
My point in this article is simply that most of the behavior we admire is that
of good people who only happen to be lawyers. We would affirm the be-
havior whether or not a person was practicing law. The issue of whether
lawyers engage in role-differentiated behavior has, of course, been with us
for a long time. Typically, the question put is whether a lawyer may do
something that ordinary morality would prohibit.75 My own view is that
there are relatively few occasions when persons who do the kinds of things
lawyers do—receive confidential information from others, for example—
have moral responsibilities different than those of lawyers.76 The question
sometimes posed today is whether lawyers have greater responsibilities
than others in some situations, for example, a special duty to do justice and
seek to free someone who has been improperly convicted.77 Once again,
while lawyers’ special skills may make them best suited to undertake such
efforts, in my view anyone with the useful skills—a police officer, for ex-
ample—similarly would have the moral obligation to use them.
Indeed, I believe what Professor Hamilton calls “professionalism
clearly defined”78 ultimately can best be seen as such personal rather than
professional characteristics. Under his principles of professionalism, each
good lawyer:
1. Continues to grow in personal conscience over his or her
career;
2. Agrees to comply with the ethics of duty—the minimum stan-
dards for the lawyer’s professional skills and ethical conduct set
by the Rules;
3. Strives to realize, over a career, the ethics of aspiration—the
core values and ideals of the profession including internalizing
the highest standards for the lawyer’s professional skill and ethi-
cal conduct;
75. See generally Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 63 (1980) (discussing and evaluating competing positions on the ethical duties of lawyering).
76. One example might be whether a lawyer has a different responsibility than a doctor to
reveal that a person the doctor has examined has a life-threatening condition, i.e., the problem
presented by Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 1962). Today, AMA CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS Op. 10.03 (1999) requires such disclosure; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2003) permits disclosure. I do not believe the responsibilities should differ;
both the doctor and lawyer should disclose in order to save the person’s life.
77. A prosecutor’s duty to do so is spelled out in MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
3.8(g)–(h); see also id. at pmbl. [1].
78. Hamilton, supra note 4, at 8.
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4. Agrees both to hold other lawyers accountable for meeting the
minimum standards set forth in the Rules and to encourage them
to realize core values and ideals of the profession; and
5. Agrees to act as a fiduciary where his or her self-interest is
overbalanced by devotion to serving the client and the public
good in the profession’s area of responsibility: justice.
a. Devotes professional time to serve the public good, particu-
larly by representing pro bono clients; and
b. Undertakes a continuing reflective engagement, over a ca-
reer, on the relative importance of income and wealth in light
of the other principles of professionalism.79
The first and last of Professor Hamilton’s principles—growth in per-
sonal conscience and reflection on the place in one’s life of income and
wealth—clearly point to personal character. I agree that both are critical
parts of mature ethical living, and both are relevant whether one is a lawyer,
a farmer, or a government official. The first of them is also the aspect of
professionalism that Professor Hamilton has tested and found important to
effective law practice.80
The second Hamilton principle, adherence to the standards that regu-
late lawyer conduct, I take as self-evident. The same goes for adhering to
required fiduciary standards. Thus, it is the remaining four principles that
require further consideration.
Professor Hamilton argues that ethical standards are not private. That
is, people exist in society, and values are not ours to choose wholly pri-
vately. We share a common humanity and learn ethical conduct from
others.81 I agree. Where I disagree is with the implication that the only or
even best understanding of good lawyer behavior is provided by other law-
yers. One does not require a law license to have important views as to the
balance between confidentiality and third-party interests, for example. Such
issues are not unique to lawyers, and we lawyers often have too much self-
interest wrapped up in the issues to think about them perceptively.82
My point is not that moral decision making comes naturally or that
character education is unimportant. Again, my point is simply that the
proper resolution of moral issues facing lawyers should be undertaken on
their own merits. Calling issues “professional” and looking primarily to
lawyers’ views about the issue is often problematic rather than helpful. The
79. Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
80. Professor Hamilton has been joined in the empirical work by Dr. Verna Monson. See
Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of Professionalism to Effec-
tiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137 (2011); Neil Hamilton & Verna
Monson, Answering the Skeptics on Fostering Ethical Professional Formation (Professionalism),
20 A.B.A. PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2011 at 3.
81. Hamilton, supra note 4, at 9–10.
82. Which conflicts of interest should be subject to consent and which not are similarly ques-
tions about which teaching from fellow professionals may be more misleading than helpful.
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Conference of Chief Justices, the association of leaders of our nation’s state
courts, was correct when it concluded:
Professionalism ultimately is a personal, not an institutional char-
acteristic. . . . The institutional framework of the legal profession
can create a climate in which professionalism can flourish, but
individual lawyers must be the ones to cultivate this characteristic
in themselves.83
V. THE CHANGING WORLD FACING THE AMERICAN LAWYER
Objecting to calling law a profession might seem a strange cause. The
professional label is a measure of status in which lawyers take pride; and if
only status were at stake, challenging the label would not be worth the ef-
fort. But more is involved. Changes in the world current and future lawyers
will face are almost inevitable. The changes are likely to transform the way
legal services are delivered and even the way the term “lawyer” has been
understood.84 The changes will be matters of substance, not semantics.
They are likely to affect important ways in which lawyers understand who
they are and the role they are likely to play in national life. I will mention
just three.
A. Globalization
Although trained in local law and licensed by state courts, American
lawyers will not be able to ignore the effects of globalization on their prac-
tice. First, globalization requires lawyers to know the legal principles that
allow clients’ international commerce to proceed. Indeed, a client engaged
in e-commerce may do virtual business everywhere in the world simultane-
ously, and a lawyer who focuses only on what was once important will
neither serve her clients well nor retain her clients for long. The day has
come and gone when national borders—and a fortiori state borders—likely
have any real significance in deciding how a transaction should be struc-
tured or a matter litigated.
American lawyers’ professional standards are also likely to be affected
by globalization as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
tends to break down barriers that today limit lawyers to practice in their
home countries. The day will come when French lawyers can open a prac-
83. A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM (1999), quoted
in Hamilton, supra note 4, at 4; see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the
Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305, 312–14 (2000); Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel,
Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065, 1086 (2010); David Luban,
How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101,
1116–17 (2010).
84. The changes make up a large part of THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN
LAWYER 73–216 (2010); see also ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS,
STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT 283 (1996).
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tice in the United States just as the European Union permits French lawyers
to practice in Germany. When that happens, of course, it seems inevitable
that a state such as California will have to also allow New York lawyers to
open a practice in San Francisco.85 In that kind of world, talk of “profes-
sional” standards will become more and more theoretical.
These developments, in turn, will be magnified by changes occurring
in lawyer regulation in other parts of the world. British lawyers, for exam-
ple, have recently experienced the most radical change in regulation in their
history. As a result of the Legal Services Act of 2007,86 the number of
activities that only a lawyer may do has been reduced:87 a law firm may
have non-lawyer investors,88 and the lawyer-client privilege extends to
communications with people who are not lawyers.89 If American lawyers
ignore the fact that their direct competitors play by different rules, they will
have only themselves to blame when clients seek the same or better services
at lower cost elsewhere.
B. Technology
Next, the increasing importance of information technology to law
practice promises to transform tasks that used to be seen as complex,
unique, and worthy of substantial fees into simple, repetitive operations
provided to clients by the lowest bidder. Technology available on the sim-
plest personal computer can instantly allow a lawyer to copy a document
used in one transaction and change the names and terms for use in the next.
Knowing what changes are needed to fit a new situation will always be a
big part of the professional’s service, but the benefits of standardizing
forms in transactions promises to be enormous.90
85. For additional information see, for example, Laurel S. Terry, GATS’ Applicability to
Transnational Lawyering and Its Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 989, 1008–12 (2001); Laurel S. Terry, But What Will the WTO Disciplines
Apply To? Distinguishing Among Market Access, National Treatment and Article VI:4 Measures
When Applying the GATS to Legal Services, A.B.A. PROF. LAW, 2003 SYMPOSIUM ISSUE, at 83.
See also Carol Silver, Winners and Losers in the Globalization of Legal Services: Situating the
Market for Foreign Lawyers, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 897 (2005) (discussing the increase in programs
at U.S. law schools for foreign lawyers, many of whom hope to practice with U.S. firms).
86. Legal Services Act of 2007, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.).
87. Id. § 12.
88. Id. § 12, sched. 13.
89. Id. § 190.
90. A rationale for wide use of boilerplate clauses is developed in Robert B. Ahdieh, The
Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (2006). Ahdieh notes: “Contrary to the rhetoric
sometimes used to describe bargaining, the ultimate goal is not to win but to agree.” Id. at 1036.
Boilerplate reduces transaction costs without eliminating the possibility of seeking strategic ad-
vantage. Depending on the standard clauses proposed, parties can seek advantage but minimize
misunderstanding because the boilerplate terms are “focal points” that have meanings parties
know from prior experience. Indeed, in bargaining, even small departures from boilerplate terms
can make agreement more difficult as the “changes raise the question, ‘Why?’” Id. at 1046.
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The transformation of standardization from a shortcut to a virtue prob-
ably began in the real estate industry with the development of the standard
form real estate contract. Similarly, the increased use of form wills and
trusts can help assure that the drafter will not have forgotten important pro-
visions necessary for desirable tax treatment.91 Form commercial docu-
ments can provide increased security that representations and warranties are
standard for commercial transactions. Even in litigation, form complaints
can help assure that each element of a claim has been properly pled.92 The
result of document standardization, of course, is that it is now an open se-
cret that what lawyers do is no longer always a complex task requiring
expertise worthy of premium pay. Much of what lawyers do is what most
merchants do (i.e., sell commodities that ultimately command only a price
set in competition with many potential sellers).93
Another technology-based reality that will transform lawyers’ practice
is the world of free information that lawyers have traditionally sold but that
is now available on the Internet. Books about law have been around for
years, but technology now makes the information ubiquitous. It is often
provided free at websites ranging from Wikipedia to specialized blogs, and
the effect is to render a great deal of formerly exotic legal information
broadly accessible. Prepared by thousands of authors, these alternative in-
formation sources threaten the monopoly on which lawyers have depended
for a steady client base.94 Clearly, lawyers will tend to be able to assimilate
and apply information from these sources more quickly and accurately than
clients can, but the breakthrough is that a lawyer’s knowledge is no longer a
91. There are a number of web sites that offer legal documents, some with additional services
and some without. See, e.g., LEGAL ZOOM, www.legalzoom.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2012); US
LEGAL FORMS, www.uslegalforms.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2012); LEGAL DOCS, www.
legaldocs.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2012); LAW DEPOT, www.lawdepot.com (last visited Jan. 27,
2012).
92. The key books in this area are RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE
CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1996), and RICHARD SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING THE
LAW (2000).
93. It would be a mistake, of course, to assume that globalization will occur equally rapidly
in every line of commerce. High-touch personal services are likely to continue to be delivered
locally. Part of the challenge in considering the impact of globalization on lawyers, then, will lie
in distinguishing which lawyer roles are more like the making of machine parts and which require
a local touch. Thomas Friedman says: “[N]o matter what your profession—doctor, lawyer, archi-
tect, accountant—if you are an American, you better be good at the touchy-feely service stuff,
because anything that can be digitized can be outsourced to either the smartest or the cheapest
producer, or both.” THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 14 (2005). Mr. Friedman also reports that it is likely over a half-million
tax returns brought to CPAs in the United States are now outsourced to India. Id. at 13.
94. See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABO-
RATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 11 (2006) (“[C]redentialed knowledge producers share the stage
with ‘amateur’ creators who are disrupting every activity they touch.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IN-
FOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 156–60 (2006).
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black box incapable of client penetration.95 Whether free or for a charge,
ubiquitous help from information services increasingly will be available to
individuals planning their own affairs, drafting their own documents, and
even appearing pro se in litigation, just as software helps millions of former
accounting clients prepare their own tax returns.96
C. The Diminished Significance of Licensing
A third change in the world American lawyers face is the declining
significance of being licensed before providing legal services. A traditional,
useful working definition of the practice of law has been that it consists of
applying the general body of law to a specific client’s question or prob-
lem.97 One might think that definition will make the boundaries of law
practice sufficiently clear that the idea of being a lawyer will remain con-
stant. But as we have seen, changes ranging from globalization to the way
clients get information foreshadow changes in what it will mean to be a
lawyer. Prohibitions of the unauthorized practice of law are likely to have
very little effect in protecting American lawyers against these changes.98
95. Management consultant Tom Peters quotes Michael Lewis as saying: “Parents, bosses,
stockbrokers, even military leaders are starting to lose the authority they once had. . . . There are
all these roles that are premised on access to privileged information. What we are witnessing is a
collapse of that advantage, prestige and authority.” TOM PETERS, RE-IMAGINE! BUSINESS EXCEL-
LENCE IN A DISRUPTIVE AGE 67 (2003).
96. Technological breakthroughs are not new to the legal profession:
Automation and technological change posed dangers to lawyers, just as they posed dan-
gers to other occupations. Social invention constantly threatened to displace them. It
was adapt or die. For example, lawyers in the first half of the [19th] century had a good
thing going in title searches and related work. After the Civil War, title companies and
trust companies proved to be efficient competitors. By 1900, well-organized, efficient
companies nibbled away at other staples of the practice, too: debt collection and estate
work, for example. . . . Nevertheless the lawyers prospered. The truth was that the
profession was exceedingly nimble at finding new kinds of work and new ways to do it.
Its nimbleness was no doubt due to the character of the bar: open-ended, unrestricted,
uninhibited, attractive to sharp, ambitious men. In so amorphous a profession, lawyers
drifted in and out; many went into business or politics because they could not earn a
living at their trade. Others reached out for a new form of practice. At any rate, the
profession did not shrink to (or rise to) the status of a small, exclusive elite.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 634.
97. This definition was used in MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1970). A
law professor does not practice law when teaching, for example, because he or she teaches the law
as it relates to hypothetical, not real, clients. Similarly, one who writes a book about law is not
thereby engaged in law practice.
98. Bar associations have set up unauthorized practice of law committees whose responsibil-
ity has been to seek injunctions against those providing services that lawyers believed they alone
were entitled to provide. Increasingly, the effectiveness of those efforts also has been reduced.
When the State Bar of Texas tried to enjoin sale of a CD-ROM called Quicken Family Lawyer,
the state legislature responded within a month with a statute declaring such sales to be legal.
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (vacat-
ing injunction based on the new statute). The public did not find theories of professionalism and
the social contract to be effective arguments against letting technology help them avoid using
lawyers. And after an earlier unauthorized practice of law case, State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona
Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961), the State of Arizona even amended its constitu-
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Lawyers themselves are breaking down traditional unauthorized prac-
tice barriers as they assist clients, not only in the states in which the lawyer
is licensed to practice but in other states or nations where the client has
legal needs.99 It used to be an open secret that many lawyers regularly vio-
lated unauthorized practice rules by taking depositions, negotiating con-
tracts, and even giving legal advice in states where they were not licensed.
Then, the California Supreme Court struck terror into lawyers’ hearts with
its Birbrower decision100 that denied lawyers the right to collect a fee for
such work. States responded with changes in their rules to approve at least
“temporary” work in states where a lawyer is unlicensed,101 and lawyers
continue to push to expand the boundaries within which they may practice.
More important, lawyers and law firms have long used paralegal per-
sonnel, nominally working under the lawyer supervision that ethical stan-
dards require, to help them deliver legal services. Corporate legal offices
are similarly in a position to use non-lawyers to provide services they need
done. Negotiating contracts, troubleshooting discrimination claims, and
even preparing court documents can all be done by non-lawyers within an
organization receiving a level of lawyer supervision and training to which
unauthorized practice rules cannot effectively speak.102
Often, the non-lawyers will benefit from lawyer assistance, and current
legal ethics rules require a lawyer in a private law firm to supervise and
take responsibility for the non-lawyer’s work;103 but within a corporation or
other organizational client, lawyer supervision need only be provided if it is
cost-effective to do so.104 And the point for purposes of this article is that
tion to assure real estate brokers the right to fill in the blanks on a real estate sales contract. ARIZ.
CONST. art. 26, § 1.
99. See, e.g., Demetrios Dimitriou, Legal Ethics in the Future: What Relevance?, in SEIZE
THE FUTURE: FORECASTING AND INFLUENCING THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 94, 96
(Gary A. Munneke ed., 2000).
100. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal.
1988).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003).
102. Professor Herbert Kritzer calls such persons “law workers” and sees them as examples of
the kinds of people with whom lawyers are likely to compete in the future. Herbert M. Kritzer,
The Future Role of “Law Workers”: Rethinking the Forms of Legal Practice and the Scope of
Legal Education, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 937 (2002); see also HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE
BROKER: LAWYERS & ORDINARY LITIGATION (1990) (finding that the work of lawyers in civil
litigation combines the work of a professional and a broker, further recommending that lawyers’
monopolies on advocacy be restricted); HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND
NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998) (analysis shows that nonlawyers are effective advocates and are
more effective than lawyers in some situations); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead,
Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
713 (1999) (describing that formal professions are losing uniqueness and are being eclipsed by
more general professions).
103. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3.
104. See, e.g., Susan Hackett, Inside Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends in the In-
House Profession, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 616 (2002) (compliance programs in areas such as
environmental, human resources, tax, marketing/antitrust, and health/safety are often under the
direction of non-lawyer compliance officers who have access to lawyers but do not necessarily
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calls for increased lawyer professionalism will do nothing to change these
realities.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DISCUSSION FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
Looking back at non-self-serving efforts in the name of professional-
ism, one must acknowledge that often more was involved than hollow
phrases. Efforts to improve the law’s fairness, to eliminate invidious dis-
crimination, and to enhance opportunities for all citizens have occupied the
public careers of many of the nation’s finest lawyers, often at real personal
cost to themselves. We all benefit from the uniform laws, simplified proce-
dures, and important reforms that lawyers have to show for their work.
There is no reason such work should end; indeed, legal educators should
hope to encourage their graduates to do more of it.
But I believe such good works by lawyers were the product of good
people who did some of their work using legal skills. In my view, profes-
sionalism as an ideal is nebulous and largely irrelevant to the issues lawyers
face. In my view, professionalism in the sense asserted by the ABA during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—and by Professor Hamilton and
others today—should be seen as dead.
The implication of my argument for legal education is that I join Pro-
fessor Hamilton in saying that there is an important place for moral forma-
tion in education generally and legal education in particular. I would offer
two additional reasons, however, for not making that effort part of a broader
proposal for “professionalism” education.
First, in times of change and uncertainty for lawyers, one of the first
places the ABA looks to cast blame and propose reform is the law schools. I
represent the Association of American Law Schools in the ABA House of
Delegates,105 and I have met more than a few delegates who would like to
exercise authority over law school admissions, curriculum, faculty hiring,
and the like. The ABA Section on Legal Education has released proposals
for increasing professionalism education in U.S. law schools.106 About the
time law schools agree to take on the task of forming “professional” iden-
tity, I can virtually guarantee that the ABA House of Delegates will deter-
mine that it is the final arbiter of the substance of what will be taught.
report to them). But see Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs
and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1163–75 (1997) (assuming a more proactive
role for corporate counsel in developing compliance programs).
105. Nothing in this article necessarily represents the view of the AALS officers or Executive
Committee.
106. The July 2011 proposed ABA Accreditation Standard 302(b)(4)(ii) would require that an
accredited law school’s graduates demonstrate “knowledge, understanding and appreciation of . . .
the legal profession’s values of justice, fairness, candor, honesty, integrity, professionalism, re-
spect for diversity and respect for the rule of law.” ABA ACCREDITATION STANDARDS
302(b)(4)(ii) (Proposed Draft July 2011).
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It is no criticism of the delegates personally to say that most have no
experience teaching law, and even less background in the field of profes-
sional formation. Even if I disagree with Professor Hamilton on occasion,
his efforts to prepare better people and better lawyers have been informed
and subject to reasoned discussion. Having educational content prescribed
by the ABA Standing Committee on Professionalism,107 the ABA Section
on Legal Education,108 and certainly the ABA House of Delegates,109 how-
ever, is not a promising prospect.
Second, I would discourage making formation of professional identity
a law school objective because of the important data coming out about
placement of U.S. law graduates. Last year, about one-third of U.S. law
graduates were required to take jobs that did not require bar passage (i.e.,
they are apparently not practicing law at all). Legend has it that entering
law students were once told, “Look to your right; look to your left. One of
you will fail your courses and not be here next year.” Today, most law
schools wait to make that speech until graduation; few of our students fail
their course work, but many fail to become professional lawyers.
I believe that is likely to remain true for a significant number of gradu-
ates for a number of years into the future, and the important question for our
students will be what we teach that will be of lasting value no matter how
they use their education. We need to be sure that law students have good
information about what their chances of particular kinds of employment are,
but it may actually be liberating for law schools and their students not to be
limited to making all students “practice ready.” In the kind of world our
graduates face, lawyers—like all citizens—will have a moral obligation to
devote their best efforts to using their skills in ways that contribute to the
public interest, whatever form their own employment may take.110 The goal
107. See, e.g., Ronald C. Minkoff, Reviving a Tradition of Service: Redefining Lawyer Profes-
sionalism in the 21st Century, 19 A.B.A. PROF. LAW., no. 1, 2009 at 1.
108. See, e.g., Donald J. Polden, Statement of Principles of Accreditation and Fundamental
Goals of a Sound Program of Legal Education, SYLLABUS, Spring 2009, at 10, 12, cited in Amy
Timmer & John Berry, The ABA’s Excellent and Inevitable Journey to Incorporating Profession-
alism in Law School Accreditation Standards, 20 A.B.A. PROF. LAW., no. 1, 2010 at 1, 1. Ethical
and professional education is one of the few substantive requirements to survive in the proposed
ABA Standards for the Accreditation of Law Schools. The vehicle for ABA action is thus ready to
be set in motion.
109. At the August 2011 ABA Annual Meeting, the House of Delegates overwhelmingly
adopted Resolution 10B, proposed by the New York State Bar Association on the eve of the
meeting with no prior warning. It places the ABA on record in favor of all law schools devoting
additional resources to making graduates practice ready and the accompanying report purports to
tell law schools how to do it. No serious weight was given by the House to the concern of the
ABA Section on Legal Education & Admission to the Bar that it had not had time to evaluate or
estimate the costs involved in implementing such a requirement.
110. Deborah Rhode has called on lawyers to become leaders and for law schools to help them
become so. E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers and Leadership, 20 A.B.A. PROF. LAW., no. 3, 2010
at 1, 1; Deborah L. Rhode, Where is the Leadership in Moral Leadership?, in MORAL LEADER-
SHIP: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY 4 (2006). The call updates
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of our law schools should be to help make our graduates more productive
human beings, not just more “professional” lawyers.
some of the message of ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). The suggestion is appropriate and perhaps now even more plausible.
